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Abstract This article examines US funded efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan National Police through a field-
based mentoring programme for officers in the area of intelligence management. Using data taken from interviews
with 10 mentors from Northern Ireland, the study examined a particular mode of delivery in detail and also considered
how evidence for future programme evaluation should be acquired. Mentoring took place in the context of operational
police stations. The evidence collected is organized under three thematics—the mentoring role, conceiving success,
and lesson learning. The study indicates that embedding mentors in operational microsystems can be an effective
mode of delivering capacity building programmes and provides a source of rich learning material to be analysed for
future programmes. The article argues for broadening future programme evaluation to capture the type of knowledge
that can be generated through qualitative research conducted by an experienced practitioner in the field.
Introduction
Police capacity building is a major element in
peacekeeping and state rebuilding efforts initiated
by western powers in nations emerging from con-
flicts (Caparini, 2015). By 2001, when the USA
intervention in Afghanistan began, the
International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program (ICITAP), part of the US
Department of Justice, was providing police train-
ing and development in over 50 countries world-
wide with an annual budget of about $50 million
allocated through various budgetary streams
(ICITAP, 2013). In US led programmes, the deliv-
ery of capacity building has been much varied in
form, content, and delivery mode, involving the US
State Department and military who both relied sig-
nificantly on private contractors paid to deliver spe-
cified services. This article deals with the efforts of
the USA to capacity build through a contractor de-
livered, field-based mentoring programme for
Afghan National Police (ANP) officers in the area
of intelligence management. The programme is
henceforth referred to as Futures. The intention
behind the study is two-fold, to learn about the
effectiveness of a particular mode of delivery, in
this case mentoring of ANP officers conducted by
former police officers from a western country and
also to consider how evidence for programme
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evaluation can be acquired. Qualitative data were
collected from mentors operating in police stations.
There has never been a strong sense that re-
sources are being effectively used in Afghanistan.
A persistent doubt has existed over the focus and
quality of training being provided by private con-
tractors (Commission on Wartime Contracting,
2009; Lovewine, 2014 pp. 51–76). Quantity of
training was often relied on to indicate progress
to the detriment of gaining understanding of out-
comes. This reflected weaknesses in evaluation and
monitoring schemes used in Afghanistan
(Connable, 2012, pp. 153–170). Both military led
and contractor-based capacity building have been
reviewed somewhat negatively in terms of cost and
effectiveness. Poorly managed contracts and inad-
equate oversight have undoubtedly undermined
the effective use of resources in police capacity
building in Afghanistan as noted in various
SIGAR Audit Reports (Special Inspector for
Afghanistan Reconstruction). A recent example
criticises the lack of performance metrics available
to assess intelligence capacity building programmes
(SIGAR, 2017). Regardless of whether it is federal
employees or contractors who deliver the capacity
building it seems clear that one major problem
faced by the USA and all other initiators of police
capacity building in Afghanistan is a poor appreci-
ation of ‘what works and why’ (Skinner, 2008). It is
clear that Afghanistan represents a very difficult
country in which to build up the capacity of a
police force along lines that are influenced by prin-
ciples and practices found in western equivalents
(Boyd and Marnoch, 2014). The availability of
large sums of money has not in itself been a suffi-
cient driver for reform. At the macro-level the issue
of identifying the best available mode of capacity
building has, it is argued, been somewhat obscured
throughout the 15 year Afghan mission conducted
by western powers, due at least in part to a lack of
stability and agreement over the structure and lead-
ership of programmes (Bayley and Perito, 2010).
For much of the time the US Government
lacked a comprehensive reconstruction plan for
Afghanistan and issued a series of broad and general
requirements for police reform programmes, leav-
ing contractors free to devise a series of pro-
grammes, which had little regard to the needs of
the ANP (Caldwell and Finney, 2010). In an
overly supplier led environment they offered train-
ing in areas where they could quickly deliver to
targeted groups. The contracting companies made
their tender bids attractive by structuring their pro-
jects around relatively easily collected performance
metrics such as number of ‘students’ trained and
the number of courses run. Data gathering and
evaluation were in any case highly problematic
due to a number of factors including differing re-
porting requirements on the part of coalition, for
example the military favoured quantitative metrics
on outputs such as the number of arrests and
weapon seizures which were likely to have an
impact on ‘war fighting’, whereas the training side
focused on outputs such as the number of officers
trained, police officers mentored, the number of
courses delivered, and the number of Intelligence
reports submitted. Evaluation should also address
the issue of attribution, or if ‘bullet proof beyond
reasonable doubt’ causation is not evident, then at
least provide strong indication that an intervention
is making a contribution to observed results (Fox
et al., 2017, pp. 54–55). For example, if a simple
outcome indicator such as deaths caused by terror-
ist action moves in a positive direction, the ques-
tion needs to be asked as to how much of this
impact is a consequence of capacity building
action. In reality Afghanistan during the period in
which this study is located was just about ‘evalu-
ation proof’ in the sense of rendering up summa-
tive accounts of attributable impacts from capacity
building programmes. A mixture of technical and
security weaknesses inhibiting the collection of
relevant data ensured this was the case (van Stolk
et al., 2011).
In this study, it has been possible to explore the
potential for qualitative evaluation as the means of
acquiring acceptable levels of knowledge concern-
ing how capacity building works. Referring to data,
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which is both context sensitive and collected from
policing experts embedded in the field, represents a
departure from the norm. While critical of contrac-
tor performance the tendency has been for govern-
ments to want more of the same centrally collected
quantified data (RAND National Defense Institute,
2012).
It is argued here that there is a need for a different
approach to performance and evaluation that pro-
vides complimentary explanations of the socio-
cultural mechanisms that make programmes work
in the sense of realizing policing principles and
practices.
Nation building efforts in Afghanistan were
launched from a deficit position with respect to
knowledge about the social structure and cultural
norms operating in the various parts of the country
where work would take place. The absence of
detailed and reliable understanding about
Afghanistan extended to its institutions including
the ANP. Sociocultural intelligence (SOCINT) is a
term applied to systematic efforts aimed at develop-
ing understandings of social and cultural principles
underpinning the societies where military and
peace-building campaigns take place (Patton,
2010, pp. 11–12). In social science terms an exercise
in applied anthropology would be taking place
(Bryman, 1989, p. 142).
Interest in finding appropriate modes of delivery
has been more apparent in police capacity building
efforts latterly. For example, a US Department of
Defense report gave particular attention to the for-
mation of ‘Police Mentoring Teams’ (Inspector
General US Department of Defense, 2011). Here,
the mode of delivery was seen to be the significant
factor rather than the volume of programme con-
tracted. Such sensitivity to education theory was
not without precedent. According to officials
from the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations mentoring and field-based training
was key to establishing professional police forces
in the Balkans and East Timor and in addition sup-
ported development of the skills learnt during more
formal training sessions and helped provide a
systematic basis for evaluating performance of the
clients (GAO Report, 2005).
Mentoring programmes imply that western staffs
have a significant knowledge of what we refer to
here as policing ‘microsystems’. Adapting a theory
originally proposed by the development psycholo-
gist Bronfenbrenner (Bronfenbrenner and
Mahoney, 1976) and subsequently adapted by
Quinn (1992) for the purposes of understanding
organizations, a policing microsystem can be
thought of as small groupings of officers who
work together on a regular basis providing the
functional first line building blocks of a police ser-
vice organization. They are difficult entities to
understand requiring attention to individual mem-
bers, their motivations, values and attitudes, and
how they interact with one another, in this case in
the act of managing intelligence. Microsystems
exist in specific contexts and must cope with or
exploit local circumstances, but are also embedded
in larger systems and organizations. Microsystems
are crucial to capacity building programmes since
the quality and value of service produced by a large
police force can be no better than the work gener-
ated by the small systems from which it is com-
posed. Each microsystem’s performance needs to
be seen in reference to higher organizational aims,
linked processes, and a shared information envir-
onment. A policing micro-system should also be
seen as a living unit that will change over time as
staff, resources, and challenges develop, rather than
a fixed entity. Improving, innovating, and impro-
vising are essential qualities of the successful self-
sustaining microsystem. The mentoring pro-
gramme we examine took place in microsystems
located in police stations. Mentors were embedded
for periods of 20 months or more. It is argued that a
particular type of rich knowledge can be derived
from interviews with western police mentors with
direct professional interaction with ANP officers in
the intelligence gathering microsystems. In acting
as mentors they in effect participated themselves in
the outworking of intelligence management policy
in the microsystem, which provided for a unique
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form of access to the first-line building blocks of
the ANP.
Mentoring
In imparting western originating knowledge and
techniques to police officers in the host country it
is important to examine the theoretical basis of dif-
ferent education processes. A useful distinction can
be made between standard training and mentoring
(Colaprete, 2009). The term training normally sig-
nifies a process driven by an individual or team who
control content and interactions. Training tends to
be impersonal and hierarchical, with the flow of
information and content downward usually in ac-
cordance with a formal plan or schedule. Training
can be a very efficient mechanism in certain cir-
cumstances offering a means of ensuring standard-
ization in employee actions, the opportunity to
scale up a programme to deal with large numbers
of trainees and replication in different places and
times (Buckley and Caple, 2009). Design factors
mean effective transfer of knowledge from a train-
ing environment to the work environment is never
guaranteed (Awais Bhatti and Kaur, 2010).
Training programmes are also predicated to
define and sequence tasks which normally require
a very detailed knowledge of the working environ-
ment, the existing abilities of trainees, as well as a
precise concept of what constitutes successful task
delivery (Stanislas, 2014). In the context of intelli-
gence management in the policing environment of
Afghanistan this was generally difficult to establish.
Mentoring and field-based learning had been
used by the UN in the Balkans (GAO Report,
2005). The UN experience pointed towards a learn-
ing cycle being required to assist clients absorb,
deploy, and develop new skills learnt during
formal training. Kolb’s Experiential Learning
Cycle (1984) links formal training and field-based
mentoring in which the client is supported and
guided by an experienced mentor to develop skills
in a work setting. Mentoring helps the client to
reflect on their experience of ‘doing’ and encour-
ages further skill conceptualization prior to the next
opportunity to practice learning. In this process the
mentor gains a sense of the local environment and
supports the client to adapt their new skills to suit
circumstances, while in turn the mentor under-
stands how things work in the field, providing
knowledge that can be fed back into the formal
training setting making it more relevant to future
clients. The presence of field-based mentors pro-
vides confidence (psychosocial support) to clients
and facilitates the informal transmission of know-
ledge, relevant to their work and professional de-
velopment (Bozeman and Feeney, 2007). Training
tends to be formal with well-defined learning
objectives delivered in a short period and in a
dedicated space, whereas mentoring is rather
more personal, with a mature seasoned mentor
providing one-on-one attention to enhance an in-
dividual’s skill set, knowledge, and performance
(Clutterbuck and Megginson, 2004; College of
Policing ND Based on CIPD Factsheet, 2015). The
mentor typically provides information, advice,
counsel, encouragement, support, and feedback to
the mentee. The mentee should utilize acquired
knowledge and resources to improve and grow
into their work role. There should also be an em-
phasis on inculcating staff with appropriate under-
standings of appropriate relationships and
behaviours in the work environment consistent
with the organization’s values. Mentors should be
individuals who are committed to supporting
junior colleagues in overcoming organizational
barriers to professional development (Garvey
et al., 2009, pp. 11–32). There is the potential for
mentors to place less stress on communicating pre-
determined instructions on new and existing skills
and instead exploit their position as someone close
to the on-going action that mentees are involved in.
In such circumstance they can identify significant
emergent organizational issues and address asso-
ciated officer behaviours. The opportunity to use
such critical incidents in the microsystems as a focal
point for mentoring provides an advantage over
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traditional training and coaching (Burdett, 1994,
pp. 133–145). Thus, in a capacity building scenario
in which developed western concepts are being
transferred to less developed states it is likely that
field mentoring will be of high value to clients.
There are also political and social reasons to rec-
ommend mentoring as the means of capacity build-
ing. Afghanistan was and remains a country where
power relations are in flux. As in other places where
western designed nation building has been at-
tempted traditional leaders have found themselves
losing influence (Hippler, 2005, pp. 3–27). A frag-
menting political and social order meant trad-
itional leaders resisted programmes that seemed
to be taking control away from them. Also efforts
at nation building were seen to be failing because
Afghans did not want to be ‘mere objects’ of exter-
nal campaigns (Spanta, 2005, p. 76). Politically,
given the tensions that exist through post-conflict
countries not wishing to be seen to be dominated by
western powers, there is a prospect that the
mentor–mentee relationship will be perceived as
more equal in comparison to conventional training
which to a certain degree will be an exercise in
replicating external practices (United Nations,
2015). Mentoring which relies on a bonding experi-
ence with the targets of intervention may be less
likely to be seen as another press for change
driven by ‘outsiders’ with their own interests and
impersonal sub-contracting chains.
Mentors if fully embedded in the microsystem
can also be ‘comrades in adversity’, a concept asso-
ciated with the action learning school of develop-
ment, where the sharing of difficulties provides a
bonding experience that facilitates the constructive
sharing of concerns and experiences (Margerison,
1994, pp. 109–110). Mentors achieving this status
are less likely to face rejection from alienated police
officers suspicious of the motives of western cap-
acity builders. The concept of mentoring is never-
theless problematic when used in the context of the
ANP. A system of learning that works in a conven-
tional western organizational context was by no
means guaranteed to be deliverable in the
circumstances encountered. A key stage in policy
transfer is the ‘handover’ of principles and practices
from the ‘donor to recipient’—grounded in a spe-
cific local context. It should be acknowledged that
this is an underdeveloped area of expertise which
requires research and the production of evidence
on how to remove constraints on this element of
capacity building (Benson, 2009, pp. 7–10). There
is certainly merit in considering how methods of
data collection, analysis, and utilization practices
could be developed around the human interactions,
which mentors undertook during the delivery of
Futures. Embedded mentors appeared to be an ex-
cellent conduit for extracting actionable SOCINT
material to be recycled in the design of subsequent
capacity building programmes.
Methods
The study examined a mentoring programme in a
single province where the USA has taken the lead
on assisting the Afghans with security. The men-
tors were working in a difficult arena where to a
large extent their role had to be self-defined. It was
clear that a high amount of reflection had taken
place among the group, which encouraged the re-
searchers to explore viewpoints that had emerged
while working in the field. Prior research and ini-
tial observations had indicated that the mentoring
programme taking place in the police station
microsystems was subject to much negotiation
and adaptation. Quantitative studies such as
those constructed around fixed question surveys
find it difficult to capture context, which was
thought to be a significant factor in the mentoring
programme. Qualitative research is generally
better suited to capturing a sense of organization
processes being completed or breaking down, ex-
ploiting the researchers proximity to the micro
system over extended periods of time (Bryman,
1989, pp. 139–141).
Empirical data are derived from interviews car-
ried out with mentors, who each worked for at least
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20 months in 14 police stations located in one prov-
ince of Afghanistan, during 2012–13. A strength of
the study is the access to the whole group involved
in mentoring. In total, 10 out of a total of 14 men-
tors associated with Futures were interviewed.
Interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis,
nearly always in the locations where the mentors
were working.
It was anticipated that interview subjects in relat-
ing mentoring experiences would use an explana-
tory discourse informed by their career experience
both past and present. While in terms of conceptual
range this might potentially limit the scope of in-
terpretation of the mentoring process, for reasons
of authenticity it was a factor the study exploited
rather than tried to eliminate. The responsive form
of interviewing employed therefore aimed to en-
courage mentors to forge interpretations in their
own language, which the study reproduces. The ex-
tensive use of interview material in form of quotes
is common practice with qualitative research.
Respondents were not tied down to narrow ques-
tions, instead being invited to take a ‘grand tour’
through the issues involved in mentoring ANP of-
ficers in the particular microsystems encountered
(Undheim, 2003). Such an approach was felt would
best prevent the interviewer imposing pre-con-
ceived ideas on the subjects. This was an important
consideration given the need to extract a rounded
interpretation of the factors understood by mentors
to count in the pursuit of programme aims. When
transcripts were analysed it was clear subjects pro-
vided authentic explanations that they constructed
in their own terms rather than recycling ‘familiar
narrative constructs’ (Miller and Glassner, 1993,
pp. 100–102).
Interviews ranged across a wide range of issues,
but always addressed the viability of Futures in
Afghanistan, relationships and cultural issues im-
pacting on progress, contextual issues such as the
availability of resources, the physical and human
geography of the province where the programme
was being implemented, and the institutional char-
acteristics of the ANP. Interview notes were written
up immediately after. The researchers subsequently
compared readings of interview transcripts and
came to an agreement on the need to focus on cer-
tain emergent themes. Transcripts have been ana-
lysed using standard transcript content analysis
techniques, with emergent patterns of issue repre-
sentation and explanation identified used to ex-
plain this particular case of capacity building
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).
Qualitative study designs tend to come with built
in limitations. The collection of data is time con-
suming, requires expertise, and is difficult to oper-
ationalize on a large scale. Survey-based research is
more readily replicated and has an internal validity
where sound quantitative methods have been
applied. Some prior knowledge of the organization
being examined is nevertheless an essential require-
ment. In situations where context relevant prior
research is very scarce it is hard to conceive of a
design being found that could identify key variables
that could be quantified.
Context—mentors, mentees, and
futures
The re-building of the ANP intelligence capacity
required outside help as a consequence of the US
prohibition on teaching/sharing its own intelli-
gence methodologies. This created an opportunity
for a major contractor who in turn recruited experi-
enced former police officers with knowledge of in-
telligence management principles and practices
derived from the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ in
roles that included inter-facing with the military.
A lengthy policy document written by ex-RUC
officers set out principles underpinning Futures,
with the operational methodology based on the ex-
perience and skills developed in counter-insurgency
tactics used by law enforcement agencies in Northern
Ireland. A version of Futures had previously been
delivered by retired RUC/PSNI Officers in Iraq pro-
viding an attractive ‘off the shelf’ option for the con-
tractors. That Futures mentees were being mentored
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by a group consisting entirely of former police offi-
cers with experience of intelligence management in
Northern Ireland added considerably to program-
matic cohesiveness.
Futures provided a model and a set of minimum
standards with which to develop an effective and
accountable police intelligence management
system. In 1976, The Bourn Report (also known
as The Way Ahead) recommended the security re-
sponse to the violence should change to being
police rather than military led (Bourn, 1976).
Two years later the Hannigan Report concluded
that a more normal policing style could increase
stability (Hannigan, 1978). Together these two re-
ports were the genesis for the Northern Irish COIN
(Counter Insurgency) policy and allowed for the
development of a more targeted and intelligence
led response against those committing the most
harm. To do this, the police developed new intelli-
gence methodologies and skills all within a rule of
law context that did improve community relation-
ships and increased stability. The model that
emerged was essentially a COIN response based
on the rule of law, albeit with some key differences
to that which would be deployed in a democratic
state during peacetime. The system itself was in-
tended to provide a structured approach based on
the identification of threats and what was known
about these threats thus generating requirements
for additional intelligence. Mentors were expected
to help their ANP mentees acquire a ‘tradecraft’ in
intelligence technology and techniques, skills to re-
cruit, and manage informants and to collect, ana-
lyse, and exploit information to meet the identified
intelligence requirement. In simple terms mentors
described the system and shared their tradecraft,
demonstrating how mentees could successfully
apply the system. Futures provided information
in Pashto and Dari for use by ANP members.
Mentoring was taking place in a capacity building
sequence which had begun with formal courses de-
livered in theatre by police trainers also recruited
from Northern Ireland.
As participant observers in a policing microsys-
tem the mentors had a unique observational vant-
age place to peel away socio-cultural veneers, which
obscured under-performing behaviours and rela-
tionships. Embedded in the working life of a
police station it was possible for them to build
empathies that in turn developed mentor–mentee
trust. Mentors had incentives to navigate phenom-
ena such as a pronounced aversion to ‘losing face’
on the part of ANP officers, who were ashamed at
being identified as deficient in a particular skill.
They could readily observe the disparity between
claims to be following procedures and operational
realities. For instance one mentor found that a
requirement for a secure storage facility for intelli-
gence records had resulted in the use of a cloth-
covered hole in a wall situated in a shared office.
In contradiction of ANP claims there were often no
established administrative procedures and little
written paperwork kept in relation to intelligence,
meaning information was frequently shared by
word of mouth. Intelligence reports to headquar-
ters might be sent in an envelope in the possession
of an officer who was required to hitch a lift in the
absence of any ANP transport resource thus com-
promising established security procedures.
Mentors also quickly realized that communication
was only possible through mobile phones, which
had to be purchased by the officers themselves.
The well-known literacy problem in the ANP was
much in evidence but could be mitigated, as men-
tors learnt, through the pairing of officers, so that
there was always one literate individual present to
make records of operational actions.
Manifestations of the language problem in
Afghanistan, where there are both Pashtu and
Dari speakers, were leading to seemingly inexplic-
able postings of officers to the ‘wrong area’, where
they would not be able to communicate with either
colleagues or the public. Mentors also became
aware of the need for a ‘lynchpin’ figure to be pre-
sent at the next level up from their microsystem
who had the ability to integrate intelligence into a
form that was analysis-ready, rather than a
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disparate collection of reports produced under dif-
ferent circumstances by individuals of varying
abilities.
While this article is focused on the microsystem
where mentors interacted with their mentees, it is
necessary to acknowledge the extent to which diffi-
cult relationships prevailed with higher levels of the
ANP, meaning the project came with many sur-
prises. The mentors had assumed that a working
organization existed and that the task was to im-
prove the skill level of the ANP officers. Preparation
for the mentors, while it included briefings on
Afghan culture from ex-pat Afghans and from
experienced mentors who had worked on similar
projects, did not adequately prepare them for the
conditions they would face on the ground.
Nevertheless, interviews indicated that the prepar-
ation was helpful up to a point and taught effective
mentoring skills stressing in particular the import-
ance of being sensitive to local culture.
The situation on the ground was fast moving and
variable with some mentors working in a reason-
ably benign environment with relatively easy free-
dom of movement and a good number of mentees
to work with. This was not always the case and
others worked in a hostile rural setting with perhaps
only one or two mentees and restricted freedom of
movement, often only able to communicate with
mentees via mobile phone. Furthermore, the
speed of programme development made it impos-
sible to brief mentors on work site conditions as
they only learnt where they were going a day or
two before departure. Often the mentor team
(mentor and interpreter or culture adviser) would
be dispatched to an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) base with instructions to
search out the base administration office, request
living accommodation and find a military escort to
take them to the ANP station in search of mentees.
Thus, mentors frequently deployed not knowing
how many mentees they would have, the current
abilities of mentees including literacy rates and or
facilities available. Working practices were neces-
sarily improvised and because the mentees as a
group had a variable capability it was usually a
case of transferring knowledge in small segments
followed by mentoring to put the new knowledge
into practice and to identify the next area for de-
velopment. One unforeseeable factor was the fre-
quency of sudden change when in line with the
prevailing organizational culture the appointment
of a new leader led to the entire staff being replaced
within weeks. For example in 2011 a new Chief of
the ANP on his appointment replaced 90% of the
intelligence staff.
In a more conventional situation the mentors
would be senior ANP officers, perhaps supported
by a high-level Force Champion (Klasen and
Clutterbuck, 2002). They would also be following
a policy approved by the ANP command. However,
Futures was brought in by a small number of ISAF
commanders who had identified a need in their
Territorial Area of Responsibility to develop ANP
intelligence officers and their local commanders.
Many senior ANP officers at provincial and HQ
levels were initially unaware of the programme
and could therefore provide no support. On arrival
mentors would brief the local ANP commanders
and build a working relationship with them.
Programme delivery was very much bottom up,
an inversion of the normal mentoring method-
ology. Only once the programme was underway
was it possible to begin approaching senior ANP
commanders and win their support for the pro-
gramme and help overcome local resistance.
Findings—interview analysis
Interview-derived data were analysed to make sense
of the mentoring process in the microsystems in
which it was located. Data have been organized
under the following themes to help provide evi-
dence on what ‘works and why’ in the task of
police capacity building:
 Identifying with the mentoring role.
 Conceiving success.
 Lesson learning.
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Extracts from interviews relate to 10 respondents
who are identified by letters A–J.
Identifying with a mentoring role
The circumstances in which they worked were very
challenging and the mentors were forced to work
out a role for themselves through a mixture of
learning and improvisation. None of the interview
subjects gave any hint of feeling that as outsiders
they lacked the credibility to be mentors to ANP
officers. This is perhaps a surprising finding given
the difficult operational circumstances that they
found themselves in, although it is quite possible
that adversity generated a ‘comrades in adversity’
effect, which provided a basis for bonding to take
place (Margerison, 1994, PP. 109–110). There are
explanations to be found in the interview tran-
scripts. Firstly, the existing condition of the ANP
meant that a top down mentoring programme was
not a viable option and this was accepted by men-
tees. The tasks and practices being mentored had
been successfully tried and tested over many years
in Northern Ireland reducing the capability and
activities of violent terrorist organizations.
Mentors having worked as intelligence officers in
Northern Ireland during this period had a belief
and confidence that if adopted, Futures would de-
velop the capability of the ANP to effectively coun-
ter terrorist groups. Furthermore, mentors
recognized some basic similarities between
Northern Ireland and Afghanistan and they could
identify with the position of the ANP enabling them
to empathize with mentees and share ‘stories’ and
experiences. In some instances the more experi-
enced ANP officers, some trained by the Soviets,
used these discussions to test the mentor’s credibil-
ity. The mentors all believed they passed this ‘test’.
Features of the ANP and individual microsys-
tems emerged as opportunities for mentors, for ex-
ample due to the strict age-related hierarchy,
younger officers tended to be overlooked and con-
fined to mundane tasks, unless they were under the
patronage of their local commander. For these of-
ficers mentors offered an innovative way to learn.
The younger group viewed us as a
means for them to further their careers
and were very keen to learn. (H)
In most cases the younger officers proved a ready
and willing audience for mentors, in this sense con-
ventional mentoring relationships could be estab-
lished in spite of the difficult circumstances.
On occasion mentors would encounter com-
manders who refused to engage, blocked access to
other officers or forbade their staff from using the
forms and procedures passed on from mentors.
. . . commanders are usually not the
people demonstrating capability and
therefore not leading well. (E)
This only improved when they were ordered to
engage and support Futures. This represents an in-
stance of learning from the negotiation of obstacles.
Such experiences pushed the Futures mentoring
team to seek engagement with senior ANP
Command officers to develop local ‘champions’
(Klasen and Clutterbuck, 2002).
A strong sense of the value of the mentoring pro-
gramme came across in interviews, respondents
identifying with a common sense of purpose in
the work they were performing. This is demon-
strated in the extracts from interviews presented
below in which the mentors were generally clear
about the significance of the role they were per-
forming and highlighted the relevance of the
Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb, 1984). This
was expressed in a number of ways. Some of the
discussions centered on the need for complemen-
tarity and sequence:
An effective training programme was
crucial to the delivery of effective men-
toring. Close working relationships be-
tween the trainers and mentors ensured
that feedback on training from mentors
assisted in developing training courses.
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Similarly, trainers were able to give
advice on the competency and skills
of students which were of benefit in de-
veloping the mentoring effort. (G)
This respondent had a positive experience of
working with trainers who had been contracted to
provide classroom-based learning; however, this
was not always the case and there were several inter-
views in which trainers were discussed in critical
terms.
I feel that the trainers would benefit
from being mentors first to enable
them to have a grasp of reality at the
coal face to enhance delivery . . . (B)
Too many classroom sessions lead to
boredom of the mentee. (F)
PowerPoint presentations for the ma-
jority . . .. are an instant turn off. (A)
In addressing what they perceived to be strengths
in the programme, interview subjects were taken
through a number of discussion points which
would allow them to identify with and refer to con-
cepts associated with mentoring, signifying that
they embraced certain values associated with
this approach to staff development in policing. It
was evident from most of the interviews that
the subjects had been dealing with a difficult
process which had required them to develop new
skills. Establishing relationships was seen as a key
stage:
Aggressive, confrontational and impa-
tient approaches [don’t work]. (B)
The key to the successes that I have had,
I feel are down to interaction on a daily
basis with the Afghans and focused one
to one mentoring to show support.
One example I can give is where a con-
cept was explained by way of briefing,
with questions taken and answered.
Practical examples were shown. Then
over a period of time each officer was
visited and time spent with them to
ensure they were on the right track
and to address any issues that they
had. This is continuing. (G)
Mentees for the most part are shrewd
and quickly establish the ‘expertise’ of a
mentor. Those men without the appro-
priate experience will very quickly be
exposed. (D)
It was also clearly indicated by all respondents
that the programme material they were using to
build capacity needed to be treated as a starting
place rather than a ‘must follow’ route to pre-deter-
mined destination point.
. . . the content must be appropriate
and achievable by the target audi-
ence . . . so program objectives must
reflect that the outcomes anticipated
will not be equivalent to the mentor’s
country. (E)
A mentor that adheres rigidly to the
Plan almost always fails to impart valu-
able lessons. (D)
The discussions conducted indicate that the
learning system required mentors to have some
degree of control over the process in the sense of
flexibility over timings and emphasis. In mentor-
ing, relationships need to be managed carefully and
this was an issue that most of the respondents
wished to stress.
If you rush them, they will feel
pushed . . . Rushing mentees, arguing
with the mentees and treating [them]
with disrespect does not work . . .. Once
trust and respect is gone you will never
regain momentum. (C)
The mentor explained why a long-term view that
accepts that success is organic was needed. It was a
case of allowing mentees to adapt their learning to
their environment, with the support and advice of a
mentor.
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The need to see the world through the mentees
eyes featured frequently in interviews, which is also
regarded as a pre-requisite in successful mentoring
programmes offered in conventional western or-
ganizational contexts.
. . . [things work] not in a way we
would be satisfied with but we have to
remember that it works for them and
generally they are happy with it. (B)
Success—how mentors conceived it
The researcher asked mentors to explain why they
thought the programme was a success. There is no
attempt being made here to claim programme suc-
cess is evidenced by the interview responses, rather
the intention is to examine how success was con-
ceptualized. When mentor responses to questions
were examined it was clear they are conceiving suc-
cess in terms of the tasks their mentees could per-
form. This implies accepting that programme
impact should be seen in terms of a sustainable
work (intelligence management) process rather
than quantifiable output or outcome metrics.
Mentors rejected the tendency to try and demon-
strate the success of intervention in solely material
terms with their responses overwhelmingly con-
structed around the perceived capabilities of those
under their influence during the programme. In
describing success in terms of individual develop-
ment the mentors were demonstrating that a bond
had been formed with the individuals concerned.
This conforms with the conventional role that men-
tors are supposed to play (Bozeman and Feeney,
2007).
The infrastructure that has been built
around a unit and equipment given to
fulfill the task is no way to measure
success. Success is in the individuals
that make the unit. (H)
When trust and a relationship begin to
develop. When the company forms
started to be used and the quality of
the written product were
enhanced . . . . Transformation on the
content of an AIR to include the an-
swers to the ‘golden questions, the con-
cept of the intelligence cycle and
targeted recruitment. (I)
Eventually small capability pockets ap-
peared in the unit consisting of people
who did the job as they were taught in
schooling. (E)
When the mentees commence replicat-
ing work practices as instructed and
producing intelligence reports as in-
structed. (F)
. . . the first operation undertaken [re-
sulted] in a number of munitions being
seized. The various departments had
worked together to bring about a suc-
cessful outcome . . . . 200 operations
later was a defining moment . . . .
Success has to be Afghans doing it for
themselves from soup to nuts. (G)
Success measured in their ability to
defeat obstacles that can be in its path
and operate independently of its
mentor. (B)
Success is in the individuals that make
up the unit. (D)
. . . mentoring effort is . . . . an over-
whelming success due to the fact that
from an ill disciplined group, a capable
company of men has been developed in
a twelve month period . . . [they are]
currently operating in overt, discreet
and covert profiles in the most hostile
districts . . . . with very little support,
using their resourcefulness to over-
come problems that face daily, be it
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the Taliban or the bureaucracy of their
parent organisation. (A)
I knew I had been successful at one of
my initial police stations when they
demonstrated their understanding (not
parrot fashion) of the Intelligence gap
and Intelligence Requirements, and
they targeted and recruited sources
that were normally out of their comfort
zone to approach. (J)
Success could also take the form of seeing struc-
tures being created and used with associated rule
creation and routine behaviour. Sustainability was
a significant part of the concept of success repre-
sented during interviews.
Those mentored while possessing a
basic intelligence background appeared
to have no structures in place to exploit
the intelligence obtained. There is now
a configured accountable reporting
system established and as a result the
flow of intelligence has vastly im-
proved. The Officers operating in the
field understand the Intelligence
Requirements and the essential need
for Source Protection. (B)
The mentoring effort was certainly sus-
tainable. This was evidenced in my own
experience with the situation whereby
mentoring . . . ceased. As the last to
leave and first to return, I had the op-
portunity to see that structures and
working practices remained, were
being adhered too and some areas de-
veloped by the Afghan mentees. (G)
I believe you find this out after an away
period; it’s a big test for your mentees
to be left to their own devices and own
choices for 1 month. Once you return it
will show you exactly where you stand
with regards to readiness, competence
and a big thing, motivation of the men-
tees to carry on the momentum. Only
when the mentees operate successfully
without your input you know its time
for transition. This will obviously take
time and will differ from place to place,
depending on support. (H)
Undoubtedly continuity . . . has been
the thread to link knowledge of organ-
isational development for the benefit of
rotating Coalition Forces so as to avoid
the trap of ‘restarting’ the mission sev-
eral times over. (J)
Learning lessons
When mentors were asked what could be learnt
from their experience on the Futures programme
a number of issues emerged as key concerns. Firstly
pre-planning was weak.
A mentor must be able to relate to his
audience . . .. ‘development could have
made progress sooner if the . . . pro-
gramme had briefed to all levels . . . [of
mentee organisation]. There was no
knowledge about the program . . . this
was a significant setback. (A)
Concentrate on mentoring the senior
managers the Provincial and District of-
fices. Once they had their office in order,
move on to the junior officers. (F)
There should have been a thorough
scoping study from the outset. This
would have uncovered deficiencies par-
ticularly at middle and senior manage-
ment levels. (D)
That the programme was targeted at the wrong
level of the ANP hierarchy was another commonly
held view.
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The programme commenced inten-
sively at the lower levels of the organ-
isation without fully educating/
mentoring the management along
similar lines [bottom up]. This is now
evident, it is preventing progress and
has some negative effect on programme
delivery. (C)
Development could also have been
enhanced if there was a selection pro-
cess in place, for example, [mentees
were] literate, [have a] driving licence
and served a minimum of 4 years. (A)
Get in at a higher level to mentor those
who have the ability to influence the
program [uptake]. The whole process
of mentoring . . . felt like it was bottom
up. More steer should have come from
[HQ] which, in my view is not strategic
enough. I suppose, if in the early days,
the PIMs were given too much discre-
tion in what they delivered. (B)
This had the consequence of senior ANP officers
failing to exploit the opportunities afforded by
Futures. In a number of locations ANP
Commanders failed to authorize their junior offi-
cers (who having undergone Futures training and
mentoring had developed significantly improved
capacity and skills) to use their newly developed
skills to collect and manage intelligence.
Discussion
In gaining an appreciation of how mentors under-
stood their role the study provides material for use
in any subsequent programme specification includ-
ing staff selection criteria. The record indicates that
systems for monitoring and evaluation of capacity
building programmes in Afghanistan require devel-
opment on lines consistent with that proposed by
van Stolk et al. (2011). Evidence collected on how
success was conceived by mentors suggests ways in
which programmes should be evaluated in broader
terms that are not wholly reliant on quantified
output metrics. As argued capacity building needs
to take place at different levels in the ANP and the
intelligence management microsystem cannot be
neglected. The study indicates that embedding
mentors in operational microsystems can be an ef-
fective mode of delivering capacity building pro-
grammes and that it is also a source of rich
learning material. The position of the mentors,
situated as they were in a first line microsystem,
gave them a unique opportunity to learn how
ANP officers had to function in an intelligence
management role. This meant identifying and
acknowledging highly constrained circumstances,
where resources were limited and relationships
with commanders often dysfunctional. When a
mentoring programme is planned it should be sup-
ported by the senior host–police service command
briefed in the principles and practices of the pro-
gramme. In the case examined much of this had not
taken place and some of what was reported refers
to encouraging mentee resourcefulness within the
microsystem, whether that was overcoming
the dangers posed by the Taliban or coping with
the wider policing system and the obstacles it pre-
sented to intelligence management. The nature of
the microsystems relationship to the larger policing
system meant that mentors needed to establish
credibility for themselves with the mentees rather
than have this assigned by higher levels of the com-
mand. The nature of one to one mentoring in the
circumstances of the case examined meant that
Futures had to be translated into Afghan terms
that mentees identified with, thus avoiding the
transfer problems associated with training pro-
grammes which are identified in the research litera-
ture. This requirement meant that the programme
avoided the fate of many initiatives, which fail be-
cause they are perceived to be based on the crude
transfer of ‘off the shelf’ western skills and know-
ledge (Page, 2000). This is likely to be a significant
factor in similar programmes delivered in the
future.
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Finding ways to convince mentees to accept that
Northern Ireland-derived principles and practices
could be transferred to Afghanistan and the par-
ticular microsystem was a crucial step. At all
times an ability to improvise rather than simply
follow a procedural formula had to be demon-
strated. Mentors talked about gaining a strong
sense of what was possible to achieve in the micro-
system. This gave them a better appreciation of
what should be regarded as success, such as dem-
onstrations of abilities to complete tasks and
achieve ends.
The case examined suggests a more nuanced
understanding of the drivers for programme suc-
cess can be developed out of the analysis of quali-
tative data derived from interviews and from
systematic recording of participant observer reac-
tions to relationships and issues. In police capacity
building in countries emerging from conflict it is
very likely that there has been an over-reliance on
conventional output-based performance metrics,
which in the future should be complimented by
alternative sources of data in order that programme
funders have a better understanding of what works
and why. This study has been based on personal
observations and formal interviews conducted in
the operational field. If, as it is argued, programme
performance measurement and evaluation needs to
have a qualitative dimension then it will be neces-
sary to find a systematic means of securing the type
of data we have used in this study. The study has
added to the understanding of the potential ways of
resolving difficulties encountered with finding ap-
propriate assessment and metrics systems identified
by Connable (2012).
Qualitative study designs tend to come with built
in limitations. The collection of data is time con-
suming, requires expertise, and is difficult to oper-
ationalize on a large scale. That there are likely to be
varied representations of incidents and relation-
ships is both a strength and weakness of qualitative
research. In terms of validity it needs to be accepted
that it may be hard to verify the accounts provided
by interview subjects. The researcher conducting
the analysis may also arrive at different conclusions
to someone else conducting the study due to their
particular background and personal characteristics.
In spite of these limitations the data collection
method used in this study was best suited for ad-
dressing the sociocultural knowledge deficit that
has presented as an obstacle to police capacity
building in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Valuable information was being collected and
informally shared by mentors, but not routinely
analysed or archived as part of their role as sub-
contractors. Conceivably although there are no
guarantees, a permanent staff engaged with capacity
building would be collecting stories which would
accumulate to create a living organizational anthro-
pology of the ANP. If on the other hand sub-
contractors are to be the main delivery agents,
then a formalized means of recording experiences
should be developed to counteract the lack of con-
tinuity and concomitant loss of operational history.
According to its proponents SOCINT should be
seen a discipline in its own right sitting alongside
more widely known intelligence gathering systems
such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals
intelligence (SIGINT). The richness of materials
used in this study does suggest a case for SOCINT
or another formal intelligence variant based around
concepts and methods associated with organiza-
tional anthropology to be incorporated in training
for mentors.
Summary of conclusions for future
police capacity building
There are a number of significant factors at work in
influencing programme effectiveness indicated by
this study, which should be noted and considered in
the future. Pre-planning and identification of
where exactly capacity building in respect of intel-
ligence management should begin in organizational
terms was hindered by an absence of detailed know-
ledge about the ANP itself. Addressing the know-
ledge deficit needs to be a priority before more
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resources are committed. The mode of delivery
should be considered carefully both in the sense
of what works with respect to creating capacities
but also in relation to building up sustainable
knowledge growing relationships. Useful informa-
tion has been collected on the form that a mentor-
ing role can take, this type of knowledge needs to be
used as a starting point for orientating future pro-
grammes for the ANP or other organizations. The
study has provided a means of recording relevant
information on the development of structures and
working practices that constitute success.
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